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NOTES

is drafted in a comprehensive manner, after due consideration of all
interests involved and with a view toward possible ramifications.
Piecemeal legislation necessarily leads to the kind of judicial rule-making
which legislators and the public so often criticize.
John Miller Shuey, Jr.

ENSURING EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR THE
CRIMINAL CO-DEFENDANT

Joint trials of two or more criminal defendants charged with the same
offense may jeopardize their individual constitutional rights to a fair trial'
and effective assistance of counsel 2 due to the possibility of a conflict of
interests among them. 3 Conflicts arise in many contexts and, with few
exceptions,' it is to the advantage of one defendant to cast the blame on his
co-defendant. The relative culpability of co-defendants is usually an
underlying issue. Thus, the individual defendant is often in the position of
of the prosecution but also against
defending not only against the charges
5
the innuendoes of his co-defendant.
The United States Supreme Court has effectively dealt with one
aspect of the situation in which a joint trial infringed on an individual codefendant's right to a fair trial. In Bruton v. United States6 the Court held
that limiting instructions to the jury are inadequate to protect a non1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. The right to assistance of counsel as secured by the sixth amendment
requires effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case. Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932).
3. "Despite what the appearances may be before trial, the possibility of a
conflict of interest between two defendants is almost always present to some degree
even if it be only in such a minor matter as the manner in which their defense is
presented." Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d ll0,114-(2d Cir. 1968).
4. For example, if the testimony of co-defendants is reciprocal to the extent
that there is no reason for counsel to attack the credibility of either, or restrict his
summation as to either, then both might be adequately represented by the same
attorney. Also, representation by single counsel would not be ineffective if both
defendants seek to blame a third party. See People v. Mason, 91 111. App. 2d 118,
234 N.E.2d 351 (1968).
5. Whenever the defense hinges on a disassociation of the co-defendants, a
conflict of interest arises which will preclude effective representation of all defendants by only one attorney. See, e.g., People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 447 P.2d 106,
73 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968).
6. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).

1290

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

confessing defendant against a co-defendant's extrajudicial confession
which incriminates him. Thus, in the limited context of a Bruton situation,
the courts must grant a severance in order to protect the non-confessing
defendant's right to confrontation. 7
The unfavorable aspects inherent in a joint trial are magnified when
co-defendants must share defense counsel. 8 Often the defense strategy will
be advantageous to one of the defendants but disadvantageous to the other.
For example, if counsel successfully objects to the admission of exculpatory statements, he may substantially injure the declarant in an attempt to
protect the other defendant. 9 Moreover, cross examination and impeachment of any testimony is limited when cross examination designed to
benefit one defendant requires development of facts which are damaging
to the other defendant.'° Also, the effectiveness of summation is diminished if counsel cannot argue the positions of both defendants with equal
zeal. 1'1 It has even been suggested that the possibility of guilt by association indicated by sharing counsel gives rise to a conflict of interests
between co-defendants.' 2 Especially adverse to the interest of any defendant is the guilty plea of his co-defendant who agrees, as part of the

"bargain," to testify for the prosecution.'3
7. Bruton has been limited to only those situations "where the out-of-court
hearsay statement is that of a declarant who is unavailable at the trial for 'full and
effective' cross-examination." Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 627 (1971).
8. The problems inherent in dual, or multiple, representation arise not only
from the court appointing one lawyer to represent two or more indigent co-defendants but also if co-defendants choose to hire the same lawyer.
9. The issue here is not confrontation but lack of the effective assistance of
counsel. See Baker v. Wainwright, 422 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1970).
10. E.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); White v. United States,
396 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1968); Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1966); Craig v.
United States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954). See also Foster v. United States, 469
F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1972).
11. "We think that it is a fair assumption that the argument of defense counsel
must of necessity have been restricted in its scope and in places restrained in its
tone by an ever present concern that his comments on behalf of one defendant did
not injure or offend the other." People v. Donohoe, 200 Cal. App.2d 17, 28, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 454, 462 (1962). But see United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 957 (1966) (Court concluded that "brushing off a co-defendant in
summation can be effective strategy."). Id. at 406.
12. People v. Prince, 268 Cal. App. 2d 398, 74 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1968).
13. E.g., United States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988 (7th Cir.
1975). But see Giles v. United States, 401 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1968). The Fifth Circuit
held that when one defendant changes his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" before
the completion of the prosecution's case, any conflict of interest is eliminated
because the co-defendant becomes the beneficiary, rather than the victim, of the
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It is generally agreed that joint representation does not, in and of
itself, deny the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 14
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court, in Glasser v. United States, 5
dealt with the issue of the effectiveness of joint counsel. It set aside
Glasser's conviction because his attorney was appointed to represent
another defendant with whom Glasser had a conflict of interest, thus
infringing upon Glasser's right to effective assistance of counsel. The
Court concluded that the attorney's representation of Glasser was "not as16
effective as it might have been if the appointment had not been made.'
Focusing on the conflict of interest between Glasser and his co-defendant,
the Court emphasized the prejudice sustained by Glasser as a result of joint
representation. Unfortunately the decision establishes no discernible test
for "conflict" and only warns against indulging in "nice calculations as to
the amount of prejudice' ' 17 arising from joint representation.
The principle of Glasser has been clarified and enacted by a federal
statute which requires federal courts to "appoint separate counsel for
defendants having interests that cannot properly be represented by the
same counsel, or when other good cause is shown."' 8 However, for the
most part, federal appellate courts have ignored this provision,' 9 choosing
instead to attempt to apply the language of Glasser, and the resulting
conflicting interpretations have created uncertainty as to circumstances,
under which joint representation will be considered ineffective. The federal courts are divided on the degree of conflict and prejudice necessary to
require separate counsel. The formulae for finding a denial of effective
assistance of counsel range from "a showing of a possible conflict of
interest or prejudice, however remote, ' 20 to requiring the defendants to
inconsistent pleas because all the blame could be shifted to the defendant who had
pleaded guilty. Id. at 532.
14. One attorney may represent more than one defendant as long as his representation is effective. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See
generally Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927 (1973); Finer, Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077 (1973).
15. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).

16. Id. at 76.
17. Id.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3006 A(b) (1970).
19.

Compare Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1968) (defendants

contended that 18 U.S.C. § 3006 A(b) was violated by thier sharing defense counsel)
with United States v. Christopher, 488 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1973) and United States ex
rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973) and United States v. Foster, 469
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972) (the court did not even mention 18 U.S.C. § 3006 A(b)).
20. United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 1973).
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demonstrate with a reasonable degree of specificity that a conflict of
interest actually existed at trial. 2' Although most courts predicate a finding
of denial of effective representation on a conflict of interest, either actual
or potential, 22 there is no widely accepted definition of "conflict." 2 3
Finding that "[an individual defendant is rarely sophisticated
enough to evaluate the potential conflicts," 24 some courts require the trial
judge to warn the defendants of the possible consequences of dual representation and require an informed waiver of separate counsel by the
defendants if they choose to proceed with common representation.25 Other
circuits reject the requirement of affirmative judicial inquiry, 26 while the
Seventh Circuit places "the primary responsibility for the ascertainment
27
and avoidance of conflict situations" on the members of the bar.
Although the problems of dual representation usually arise in situations where one attorney is appointed by the court to represent two or more
indigent co-defendants, an attorney retained by co-defendants may also
find a conflict of interest between his clients. Overall, the courts show
See also Walker v. United States, 422 F.2d 374, 375 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
915 (1970).
21. United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S.
1049 (1976). See also United States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988
(7th Cir. 1975).
22. E.g., United States v. Boudreaux, 502 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1972). Some courts require a showing of
prejudice in addition to a conflict of interest. "Joint representation becomes improper only in those cases where prejudice results so as to deny a defendant the
effective assistance of counsel." Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1969). See also United States v. Smith, 464
F.2d 194 (10th Cir. 1972); Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968);
Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Note, 58 GEO. L.J. 369
(1969).
23. A "conflict of interests" has been defined as "a situation [where] the
parties are placed in adversary and combative positions." Sawyer v. Brough, 358
F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1966).
24. Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
25. E.g., United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (lst. Cir. 1972); United States v.
Miller, 463 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1972); Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Campbell v. United Stites, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
26. E.g., United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1049 (1976); United States v. Boudreaux, 502 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Christopher, 488 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1973). The Third Circuit has
endorsed the desirability of a rule "which assumes prejudice and nonwaiver if there
has been no on-the-record inquiry by the court" but has not adopted this requirement. United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 1973).
27. United States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988, 994 (7th Cir.
1975).
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more concern over the burden that dual representation places on courtappointed defense counsel, but retained counsel for criminal co-defendants should recognize and evaluate the myriad problems presented by
multiple representation. The risk of unforeseen and sometimes unforeseeable conflicts create ethical considerations which should be resolved in
favor of separate counsel unless there is no other way to provide adequate
representation for the defendants. 28 Joint representation itself denies any
assurance that the statements made by a defendant to his lawyer are made
in full confidence. Any conflicting statements would necessitate confrontation of both defendants and may put the defense counsel in the position
of "judging" which defendant is telling the truth. 2 9 The American Bar
Association Standards place the primary responsibility for ascertaining the
possibility of conflict on the attorney and advise that a "lawyer . . .
should not undertake to defend more than one defendant in the same
criminal case if the duty to one of the defendants may conflict with the
duty to another.' '30 Dual representation should be undertaken only in
unusual situations and then only after informed consent by the several
31
defendants.
The Louisiana judicially developed standard for the appointment of
32
separate counsel requires factual allegations of "antagonistic defenses."
Ignoring the dictates of Glasser and its emphasis on possible conflict,
Louisiana's standard has the effect of denying separate counsel even in the
face of substantial conflict between defendants. It is consistently held that
"the mere assertion that the defenses in a joint trial are antagonistic, or
that a substantial conflict exists, is not sufficient to require the appoint28.

ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO THE

DEFENSE

FUNCTION,

§ 3.5(b), comments

(1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA

STANDARDS].

29. Id.
30.

Id., § 3.5(b) provides: "Except for preliminary matters such as initial

hearings or applications for bail, a lawyer or lawyers who are associated in practice
should not undertake to defend more than one defendant in the same criminal case
if the duty to one of the defendants may conflict with the duty to another. The
potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that
ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more than one of several co-defendants
except in unusual situations when, after careful investigation, it is clear that no
conflict is likely to develop and when the several defendants give an informed
consent to such multiple representation." (Emphasis added).

31. Id.
32. State v. Finley, 341 So. 2d 381, 383 (La. 1976); State v. Alexander, 334 So.
2d 388, 391 (La. 1976); See also State ex rel. Thompson v. Henderson, 306 So. 2d
713 (La. 1975) (court did not apply the antagonistic defenses standard but did
require a showing of actual conflict).
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ment of separate counsel." 33 The most recent application of the "antagonistic defenses" standard is in State v. Alexander. 34 Alexander and his codefendant, Wilson, were charged with distribution of heroin and an attorney was appointed to represent both defendants. On the day of the trial,
defendant Alexander, not the court-appointed attorney, urged that separate
counsel be appointed for both defendants and requested a continuance,
stating that a friend had hired an attorney to represent him in the case. The
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's denial of the request
for separate counsel on the ground that no specific facts were developed at
trial to indicate "that antagonism or conflict between the defenses does in
35
fact exist.''
As in prior decisions, the court required specific facts to demonstrate
the actual existence of antagonism but did not outline what constitutes
"antagonism" or "substantial conflict." This requirement frustrates appellate inquiry into the denial of effective assistance of counsel because, as
in Alexander, once a motion for separate counsel has been denied and
counsel represents all defendants equally at trial, the result will be a record
lacking the necessary antagonism for reversal on appeal. In reviewing the
effect of the denial of a motion for separate counsel, the supreme court has
not been concerned with the prejudice that the defendants might have
sustained, or the possible outcome had each defendant been individually
represented.
The problems of joint trials in Louisiana are further compounded by
liberal joinder provisions and a strict severance policy. Recent legislation
provides for joinder of offenses 36 as well as joinder of defendants. 37 Read
together, these provisions allow two or more defendants alleged to have
33. State v. Baker, 288 So. 2d 52, 57 (La. 1973).

34. 334 So. 2d 388 (La. 1976).
35. Id. at 391. The court affirmed the denial of the motion for continuance on
different grounds, citing State v. Austin, 258 La. 273, 246 So. 2d 12 (1971): "A
denial of a motion for a continuance made on the day of trial on grounds that the
defendant is dissatisfied with his attorney has been held to be proper." 334 So. 2d at
391.
36. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493 provides: "Two or more offenses may be
charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense
if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors, are of the same or
similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts
or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or
plan; provided that the offenses joined must be triable by the same mode of trial."
37. Id. art. 494: "Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or
offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count."
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participated in the same act to be charged in the same indictment or
information "in one or more counts together or separately and all of the
defendants need not be charged in each count." 38 Thus it would be
possible for co-defendants to find themselves in a joint trial for a common
offense with additional similar offenses 39 charged against one of the
defendants separately.4 0 This scheme complicates the already complex

problems inherent in joint trials and is magnified when the court appoints
the same attorney to represent both defendants.
Louisiana's liberal joinder provisions are patterned after the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure,' 4 but Louisiana's severance policy is much
more restrictive. 4 2 In order to obtain a severance in Louisiana, co-defendants must allege specific facts which indicate antagonistic defenses. 3
Severance is the exception rather than the rule. The granting or denial of a
motion for severance is within the discretion of the trial judge, and, unless
there is a clear abuse of discretion, his ruling will not be disturbed on
appeal.44
38. Id.
39. See id. art. 493 (requiring the offenses be of the same or similar character).
40. Such a trial could very easily result in prejudice to the defendant who is
charged only in the common offense but whose guilt is judged by a jury which is
also considering the evidence of the other defendant's separately charged offenses.
41. Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "The court
may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried together if
the offenses, and the defendants if there is more than one, could have been joined
in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as if the
prosecution were under such single indictment or information." See also Comment,
Joinderof Offenses: Louisiana'sNew Approach in HistoricalPerspective, 37 LA. L.
REV. 203 (1976).
42. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 ("if it appears that a defendant or the
government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment
or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election
or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever
other relief justice requires.") with LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 704 ("Jointly indicted
defendants shall be tried jointly unless: (1) The state elects to try them separately;
or (2) The court . . .is satisfied that justice requires a severance."). Article 704
provides for severance of defendants only, without adopting the broader federal
provision for severance of offenses. See comment (b). Although article 704 permits
the trial judge to grant a severance when justice requires it, the article sets no
standards for the exercise of this authority; and as a result the jurisprudence
developed the "antagonistic defenses" test. See State v. McSpaddin, 341 So. 2d
868 (La. 1977); State v. Jenkins, 340 So. 2d 157 (La. 1976); State v. Thibodeaux, 315
So. 2d 769 (La. 1975).
43. E.g., State v. Thibodeaux, 315 So. 2d 769 (La. 1975); State v. Baker, 288
So. 2d 52 (La. 1973).
44. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 250 La. 64, 193 So. 2d 787 (1967); State v.
Mack, 243 La. 369, 144 So. 2d 363 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 917 (1963).
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Barring a relaxation of Louisiana's stringent policies on severance,
appointment of separate counsel is the most feasible mechanism to protect
the individual co-defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. The only
legitimate justification for denying a request for separate counsel is judicial efficiency and economy. While judicial efficiency may be a valid
reason for joint trials and conservative severance policies, the argument
has no force with respect to the denial of a request for separate counsel.
Such a denial may result in a delay of the trial for application for
supervisory writs, or require appellate review of the denial with the
possibility of a vacated conviction and retrial. Viewed in this light,
separate counsel may prove to be more efficient. Also, an absolute rule
requiring separate counsel on request would free the courts from "the
impossible task of speculating about what might have happened at a trial in
45
which each defendant had his own lawyer."
To ensure effective representation of each defendant, the trial court
should have the duty to inform the defendants and counsel of the possible
consequences of joint representation.4 6 This procedure would meet the
requirement of Glasser that trial courts "refrain from embarrassing counsel in the defense of an accused by insisting, or . . . suggesting that

counsel undertake to concurrently represent [divergent] interests." 47 Once
the trial court has informed the co-defendants, the responsibility for the
decision to proceed with only one defense counsel should rest with the
defendants and their attorney. 48
Attorneys, retained or appointed to defend more than one criminal
defendant, should, as a matter of ethics, evaluate the possibility of conflict. Even though the present Louisiana standard demands actual conflict
or antagonism, the ABA Standards suggest, and the Louisiana Code of
Professional Responsibility 49 requires, that the attorney decline represen45. Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1972); United States
v. Miller, 463 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1972); Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
47. 315 U.S. at 76.
48. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 28, § 3.5(b); LA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, E.C. 5-15 to 5-17, D.R. 5-105 (found in ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR Ass'N art. XVI; LA. R.S. 37, ch. 4, app.).

49. E.C. 5-15: "If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue representation of multiple clients having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he
accepts or continues the employment. He should resolve all doubts against the
propriety of the representation. A lawyer should never represent in litigation
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tation if there is a possibility of conflict. If the attorney's honest evaluation
of the case is that the best interests of all defendants would be advanced by
common representation, then the defendants would have the option to
waive separate counsel. 50 If, on the other hand, the attorney or the
defendants feel that effective representation demands separate counsel,
that request should be respected by the trial court. 5 ' In any case, codefendants should be informed of the possible consequences of joint
representation and given the opportunity to have individual assistance of
counsel if they choose. 52
Kathleen K. Stewart
multiple clients with differing interests; and there ate few situations in which he
would be justified in representing in litigation multiple clients with potentially

differing interests."
E.C. 5-16: "[I1t is nevertheless essential that each client be given the opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free of any potential conflict and to
obtain other counsel if he so desires. Thus before a lawyer may represent multiple
clients, he should explain fully to each client the implications of the common
representation and should accept or continue employment only if the clients consent ...."

E.C. 5-17: "Typically recurring situations involving potentially differing interests are those in which a lawyer is asked to represent co-defendants in a criminal
case. . . .Whether a lawyer can fairly and adequately protect the interests of
multiple clients in these and similar situations depends upon an analysis of each
case. In certain circumstances, there may exist little change [sic] of the judgment of
the lawyer being adversely affected by the slight possibility that the interests will
become actually differing; in other circumstances, the chance of adverse effect
upon his judgment is not unlikely."
D.R. 5-105(C): "[A] lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that
he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the
representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on
the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each." See also
State v. Baker, 288 So. 2d 52, 58 (La. 1973) (Barham, J., dissenting).
50. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Holland v. Henderson, 460 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972); Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). It should be noted that the issue of valid waiver presents distinct
problems: for example, if both defendants waive an opportunity for separate
counsel at the outset and during trial a conflict of interest arises, will the initial
waiver be binding?
51. See, e.g., People v. Gallardo, 269 Cal. App. 2d 86, 74 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1969).
52. The recent indigent defense legislation should insure that there will be
enough lawyers to provide individual defense counsel for criminal co-defendants.
LA. R.S. 15:141-49 (1976).

